COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

vs

STEVEN FRANKLIN MORDEN

	Defendant

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR THE 26TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COLUMBIA COUNTY BRANCH, PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL DIVISION

CASE NO:  754 of 2000  

RICHARD KNECHT, ESQUIRE, Attorney for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
HUGH SUMNER, ESQUIRE, Attorney for Defendant

FINDINGS

     After hearing held on May 8, 2002, regarding defendant’s Motion to Suppress Statements to Police, the court makes the following findings:

1.	Pursuant to a crime investigation, Briar Creek police officer Thomas Frace called the 18 year old high school student defendant and asked him to come to the Briar Creek Police station for an interview.  The officer did not say what the interview concerned.

2.	On July 17, 2000, defendant came to the police station willingly with his parents.  Defendant willingly signed a form (Com. Exhibit #1) on police stationery which indicated that he understood that he was free to leave the non-custodial interrogation at any time.

3.	Defendant asked if his parents could be present for the interview, and the officer permitted them to be present.  

4.	Defendant then willingly signed a “Miranda Warning and Waiver” (Com. Exhibit #2).

5.	With defendant’s parents present, Officer Frace started the interview and told defendant about the allegations against him.  Defendant consistently denied any of the accusations.

6.	Twenty-five minutes into the interview, the parents indicated a desire to leave the room, and they in fact left.  Defendant did not object.  Defendant himself was free to leave and terminate the interview, but he stayed and the interview continued.

7.	Officer Frace then advised defendant that he knew defendant was lying and that if he were honest, the officer would be “fair” to him.  He also said that if defendant “came clean” with everything, he would inform the D.A. and the judges that he was cooperative and would mention the cooperation to the Magistrate to help with bail so that he could finish high school.  He also told defendant that he may have to go to jail.   

8.	Approximately five minutes after his parents left, defendant put his head down, started to cry, and said “I did it.”  He then elaborated on the details, and reduced them to writing on a form entitled “Voluntary Statement.”  (Com. Exhibit #3).

9.	Defendant always knew he had a right to leave the room and the interrogation.  The interview lasted approximately one and one-half hours.

10.	 Officer Frace performed the interview in good faith
            and was not oppressive or misleading.

11.	 Defendant’s statements given to the police, in
    particular to Chief Thomas Frace, were given
    knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

   12. Defendant’s statements were not procured by force or 
    threats.

DISCUSSION

     The issue before this court is whether the police officer’s statements and promises made to defendant, after the Miranda warnings were given, rendered his confession involuntary using the “totality of circumstances test.”  We find that the confession was voluntary.
     Defendant submits that this case is governed by Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 520 Pa. 151, 553 A.2d 409 (1989).  However, Gibbs narrowly focused on facts where promises were made to a defendant only after he suggested that he may want to talk to a lawyer.  Id. 520 Pa. at 152, 553 A.2d at 410.  In our case, defendant had willingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and had not raised the issue of talking to a lawyer.
     Moreover, the facts in the recent case of Commonwealth v. Templin, 2002 WL 704691 (Pa.)(April 24, 2002), are extremely similar to those in our case.  In Templin the circumstances of the police interview were almost precisely like the interview in our case, including, after a Miranda waiver was signed, a suggestion that ROR bail would be recommended for cooperation.  Defendant argued that Gibbs had established a “bright line rule” of exclusion automatically invalidating confessions following an offer of leniency.  Id. at 3.  However, the Supreme Court held that “voluntariness is determined by considering the totality of the circumstances.”  Id.  “In determining voluntariness, the question ‘is not whether the defendant would have confessed without interrogation, but whether the interrogation was so manipulative or coercive that it deprived the defendant of his ability to make a free and unconstrained decision to confess.’” Id. at 6 (citing Commonwealth v. Nester, 551 Pa. 157, 163,709 A.2d 879, 882(1998).  “Factors to be considered in assessing the totality of the circumstances include ‘the duration and means of the interrogation; the physical and psychological state of the accused; the conditions attendant to the detention; the attitude of the interrogator; and any and all other factors that could drain a person’s ability to withstand suggestion and coercion.’”  Id., citing Nester, 551 Pa at 164, 709 A.1d at 882.
     As in Templin, the totality of the facts and circumstances in our case clearly establish a voluntary confession.  “Of primary importance in this case is the fact that appellant was fully apprised of, and expressly waived, his Miranda rights, including the right to counsel and the right to remain silent, before any substantive questioning began, and well before the alleged inducement to confess.”  Id. at 6.  This occurred in our case.
     As in Templin, defendant voluntarily went to the police station; the interview was conducted by a single policeman and lasted at most one and one-half hours; there was no physical coercion; defendant knew he could leave at anytime; defendant was not impaired by drugs or alcohol; and the interview was not sprung on defendant.
     Furthermore, as in Templin, the officer’s suggestion of seeking ROR bail (so that defendant could finish high school in our case) was not misstated or overstated.  In fact, the officer fulfilled his promise in our case.  “The absence of any misstatement or misleading promise weighs in favor of a finding of voluntariness.”  Templin at 7.
     After considering the totality of circumstances in this case, this court finds that defendant’s statements to the police officer were voluntary and should not be suppressed. 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

vs

STEVEN FRANKLIN MORDEN

	Defendant

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR THE 26TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COLUMBIA COUNTY BRANCH, PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL DIVISION

CASE NO:  754 of 2000  

ORDER

	AND NOW, this 14th day of May 2002, defendant’s Motion to Suppress Statements is DENIED.

			BY THE COURT:

			_________________________________ 
			HONORABLE THOMAS A. JAMES, JR., J.